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Social	  science	  today	  often	  contents	  itself	  with	  trying	  to	  explain	  particular	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  general	  
models	  without	  understanding	  those	  events	  as	  experienced	  by	  the	  people	  being	  studied	  and	  without	  
providing	  findings	  that	  might	  help	  people	  address	  the	  problems	  they	  are	  experiencing.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  
that	  the	  recent	  development	  of	  social	  science	  has	  focused	  too	  much	  on	  its	  own	  ‘evidence-­‐inference	  
methodological	  core’	  and	  has	  lost	  sight	  of	  what	  is	  being	  studied,	  who	  is	  being	  studied,	  and	  how	  the	  
results	  of	  research	  can	  challenge	  popular	  understanding,	  misconceptions,	  and	  power	  relations.	  At	  the	  
most	  basic	  level,	  our	  edited	  volume	  Real	  Social	  Science:	  Applied	  Phronesis	  (Cambridge,	  2012)	  is	  designed	  
to	  provide	  examples	  of	  research	  that	  is	  situated	  in	  real	  communities,	  grows	  out	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  
people	  in	  those	  communities	  and	  is	  conducted	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  help	  those	  people	  address	  those	  
concerns.	  These	  examples	  demonstrate	  that	  what	  we	  are	  calling	  “phronetic	  social	  science”	  (as	  originally	  
coined	  by	  Bent	  Flyvbjerg)	  offers	  a	  meaningful	  approach	  for	  making	  social	  science	  useful	  and	  relevant	  to	  
real	  people	  experiencing	  real	  problems.	  Phronetic	  social	  science	  calls	  for	  social	  scientists	  foregoing	  the	  
attempt	  to	  build	  generic	  models	  of	  social	  behavior	  and	  instead	  situate	  their	  work	  in	  ongoing	  political	  
struggles	  as	  they	  occur	  in	  specific	  contexts.	  	  
The	  three	  short	  essays	  in	  this	  symposium	  on	  issues	  raised	  by	  our	  collection	  are	  most	  welcomed	  not	  just	  
for	  their	  generous	  compliments	  but	  also	  for	  their	  thoughtful	  criticisms	  that	  help	  move	  the	  debate	  about	  
our	  work	  further.	  The	  key	  issue	  is	  what	  to	  make	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  phronetic	  social	  science	  now	  that	  it	  is	  
associated	  with	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  research	  projects	  across	  the	  social	  sciences.	  In	  our	  volume,	  we	  
suggest	  that	  the	  case	  studies	  provided	  by	  our	  colleagues	  highlight	  how	  phronetic	  social	  science	  is	  not	  
just	  context-­‐specific	  and	  designed	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  addressing	  issues	  people	  are	  confronting,	  but	  that	  it	  
is	  research	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  power	  relations	  and	  the	  tension	  points	  that	  those	  power	  relations	  create.	  
Focusing	  on	  tension	  points,	  we	  suggest,	  is	  key	  to	  making	  phronetic	  social	  science	  useful.	  These	  tension	  
points	  highlight	  how	  power	  relations	  are	  standing	  in	  the	  way	  of	  addressing	  the	  particular	  problems	  
being	  studied.	  	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  this	  response.	  We	  focus	  on	  selected	  tension	  points	  our	  
commentators	  have	  provided	  in	  the	  name	  of	  helping	  to	  make	  progress	  on	  moving	  phronetic	  social	  
science	  forward.	  (Our	  commentators	  have	  given	  us	  much	  to	  consider	  but	  space	  limitations	  prevent	  us	  
from	  considering	  all.)	  
Our	  first	  tension	  point	  comes	  from	  Brian	  Caterino’s	  ideas	  of	  ‘mutual	  understanding’	  and	  ‘collaboration’	  
between	  researchers	  and	  actors.	  He	  appears	  to	  be	  arguing	  that	  phronetic	  social	  science	  must	  have	  these	  
features,	  but	  we	  disagree.	  Phronetic	  researchers	  may	  decide	  such	  mutual	  understanding	  will	  form	  part	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of	  their	  research,	  but	  phronetic	  research	  itself	  can	  be	  done	  (and	  indeed	  already	  exists)	  that	  is	  without	  
such	  mutual	  understanding.	  For	  us,	  the	  notion	  of	  mutual	  understanding	  in	  phronesis	  is	  the	  
understanding	  among	  the	  reference	  group	  to	  which	  the	  researchers	  consider	  themselves	  to	  belong,	  i.e.,	  
the	  group	  that	  shares	  the	  same	  concerns	  as	  the	  researchers;	  and	  this	  group	  may	  or	  may	  not	  include	  
actors.	  The	  same	  argument	  applies	  to	  collaboration.	  Phronetic	  social	  science	  may	  engage	  in	  
collaboration	  but	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  phronetic.	  Beyond	  this	  major	  tension	  point	  with	  
Caterino,	  we	  object	  to	  the	  ideas	  that	  a	  phronetic	  researcher	  must	  be	  a	  ‘superior	  individual’	  and	  ‘stand	  
above’	  the	  moral	  commitments	  of	  participants.	  In	  both	  cases,	  we	  do	  not	  see	  the	  phronetic	  researcher	  as	  
superior	  or	  above	  that	  which	  he	  or	  she	  studies,	  rather	  he	  or	  she	  may	  remain	  ‘outside’	  the	  moral	  
commitments	  of	  participants;	  a	  position	  that	  is	  in	  our	  view	  more	  consistent	  with	  Foucault.	  
	  
The	  second	  major	  tension	  point	  comes	  from	  John	  Gunnell’s	  thoughtful	  essay	  questioning	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  theory	  to	  practice	  (and	  by	  extension,	  research	  to	  social	  action).	  
Gunnell	  shares	  with	  us	  a	  concern	  about	  reification,	  or	  how	  much	  of	  social	  science	  modeling	  ends	  up	  
studying	  reified	  models	  of	  its	  subject	  matter	  without	  giving	  due	  appreciation	  that	  these	  are	  at	  best	  
heuristic	  devices	  and	  not	  the	  thing	  in	  itself.	  Gunnell’s	  mention	  in	  this	  regard	  of	  Max	  Weber’s	  concerns	  
about	  Economics	  as	  a	  discipline	  is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  social	  science	  is	  
best	  when	  it	  puts	  reified	  models	  aside	  and	  situates	  its	  investigations	  in	  specific	  contexts	  as	  experienced	  
by	  the	  people	  being	  studied.	  Part	  of	  our	  reasoning	  is	  that	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  is	  how	  
people	  on	  the	  ground	  are	  experiencing	  social	  relations,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  abstract,	  universal	  
causal	  models.	  Gunnell’s	  complaint	  with	  our	  version	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  this	  “interpretive”	  approach	  is	  that	  
it	  draws	  on	  an	  outdated	  and	  repudiated	  model	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  natural	  sciences	  from	  the	  social	  
sciences.	  For	  Gunnell,	  both	  the	  natural	  sciences	  and	  the	  social	  sciences	  are	  interpretive	  in	  that	  they	  
provide	  interpretations	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  being	  studied.	  The	  difference	  for	  Gunnell	  is	  that	  while	  the	  
natural	  sciences	  “present”	  an	  interpretation	  of	  their	  subject	  matter,	  the	  social	  sciences	  “represent”	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  interpretations	  the	  people	  being	  studied.	  We	  agree	  on	  this	  distinction	  between	  
the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences	  and	  also	  agree	  that	  social	  science	  needs	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  problems	  
of	  reification.	  If	  we	  take	  this	  tension	  point	  seriously,	  it	  can	  move	  phronetic	  social	  science	  forward	  by	  
making	  the	  clash	  of	  interpretations	  (within	  a	  political	  community	  or	  social	  setting,	  but	  also	  between	  
researchers	  and	  the	  people	  being	  studied)	  a	  key	  focus	  for	  getting	  at	  what	  impedes	  action	  to	  address	  a	  
problem.	  	  
A	  third	  major	  tension	  point	  comes	  when	  Gunnell	  worries	  aloud	  that	  phronetic	  social	  science	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  
repeating	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  past	  in	  trying	  to	  make	  social	  science	  matter.	  	  For	  Gunnell,	  social	  science	  
best	  gives	  up	  the	  hope	  of	  being	  political,	  taking	  sides,	  trying	  to	  be	  relevant,	  etc.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  best	  when	  it	  
sticks	  simply	  to	  trying	  to	  offer	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  being	  studied.	  Theory	  is	  theory	  and	  
practice	  is	  practice.	  Here	  the	  tension	  point	  is	  inflected.	  We	  disagree	  in	  that	  social	  science	  as	  an	  
interpretive	  enterprise	  cannot	  but	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  offering	  of	  interpretations	  that	  people	  are	  using	  to	  
make	  sense	  of	  their	  experiencing.	  Social	  science	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  relevant	  whether	  it	  wants	  to	  be	  or	  not.	  
The	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  will	  perform	  its	  relevance	  effectively.	  Clarifying	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  good	  
interpretation	  is	  itself	  taking	  sides,	  engaging	  in	  advocacy	  and	  proposing	  solutions.	  Michel	  Foucault	  
popularized	  the	  term	  “discursive	  practices”	  to	  highlight	  how	  theory	  was	  imbricated	  in	  practice	  and	  vise	  
versa.	  The	  theory/practice	  divide	  is	  as	  Gunnell	  suggests	  a	  non-­‐issue	  but	  not	  necessarily	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  
he	  states.	  To	  theorize,	  to	  engage	  in	  research,	  to	  interpret	  social	  action	  is	  ineliminably	  a	  form	  of	  that	  
social	  action	  and	  when	  done	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  directly	  connected	  to	  specific	  social	  struggles	  it	  becomes	  
part	  of	  that	  struggle.	  Phronetic	  social	  science	  grows	  out	  of	  a	  specific	  context	  of	  social	  struggle	  so	  as	  to	  
further	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  those	  conflicts,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  by	  focusing	  on	  interpretive	  tension	  points	  in	  
particular.	  Phronetic	  social	  science	  operates	  as	  a	  more	  systematic,	  reflexive,	  even	  meditative	  moment	  
within	  social	  struggle,	  not	  something	  apart	  from	  it.	  The	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  discursive	  practice	  suggests	  that	  
this	  is	  how	  it	  should	  be	  (making	  phronetic	  social	  science	  not	  an	  unnatural	  violation	  of	  the	  
theory/practice	  divide).	  
Despite	  our	  agreement	  with	  much	  of	  what	  Gunnell	  writes	  there	  are	  remaining	  areas	  of	  difference	  that	  
we	  would	  like	  to	  address.	  First,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  necessary	  institutional	  transformation	  for	  making	  
social	  science	  matter	  is	  likely	  to	  come	  from	  the	  top,	  but	  history	  shows	  us	  that	  there	  are	  countless	  
examples	  of	  real	  institutional	  transformations	  that	  have	  been	  sustained	  precisely	  because	  they	  have	  
come	  from	  below	  (e.g.	  the	  struggle	  for	  citizenship	  rights,	  improved	  labour	  conditions,	  women’s	  rights,	  
gay	  rights	  among	  many	  others).	  	  There	  is	  a	  real	  opportunity	  for	  contributing	  effectively	  to	  similar	  
transformations	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  social	  science	  we	  have	  assembled	  in	  this	  volume.	  Second,	  Gunnell	  
argues	  that	  we	  advocate	  for	  a	  social	  science	  that	  has	  the	  capacity,	  ability	  and	  opportunity	  to	  intervene	  in	  
social	  practices	  akin	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  natural	  scientists	  seek	  to	  control	  nature.	  In	  fact,	  our	  position	  is	  
exactly	  the	  opposite.	  Third,	  he	  makes	  a	  rather	  ethnocentric	  argument	  that	  somehow	  the	  phronetic	  
approach	  would	  only	  really	  work	  in	  contexts	  with	  which	  we	  are	  intimately	  familiar	  (i.e.	  Aalborg,	  
Denmark),	  while	  we	  have	  shown	  throughout	  the	  chapters	  in	  Real	  Social	  Science	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  our	  
discussion	  of	  tension	  points	  that	  the	  phronetic	  approach	  must	  always	  be	  adapted	  and	  modified	  to	  fit	  
particular	  contexts,	  such	  as	  the	  work	  that	  Flyvbjerg	  has	  done	  in	  Africa	  and	  Landman	  in	  China,	  mentioned	  
in	  the	  book.	  Finally,	  we	  contest	  the	  comparison	  of	  our	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  phronetic	  approach	  to	  
Mormon	  missionaries	  and	  Jehovah	  Witnesses,	  as	  both	  these	  communities	  are	  based	  on	  faith,	  and	  the	  
one	  obvious	  demonstration	  in	  our	  volume	  is	  the	  real	  empirical	  difference	  the	  phronetic	  approach	  has	  
made	  to	  the	  research	  process	  and	  research	  results	  detailed	  in	  the	  case	  studies.	  
The	  final	  major	  tension	  we	  wish	  to	  highlight	  here	  comes	  from	  Ed	  Soja	  whose	  essay	  focuses	  penetratingly	  
on	  the	  importance	  of	  spatiality	  for	  phronetic	  social	  science.	  Soja	  appropriately	  notes	  the	  Ranu	  Basu	  
contribution	  to	  our	  volume	  entitled	  “Spatial	  Phronesis.”	  Yet,	  he	  is	  concerned	  that	  we	  did	  not	  integrate	  
her	  focus	  on	  spatiality	  into	  our	  overall	  explanation	  of	  phronetic	  social	  science,	  leaving	  us	  vulnerable	  of	  
being	  accused	  of	  re-­‐inscribing	  the	  longstanding	  social	  science	  prejudice	  against	  space	  in	  preference	  of	  
privileging	  time.	  In	  this	  regard,	  we	  are	  happy	  to	  stand	  corrected	  and	  thus	  need	  to	  highlight	  more	  the	  
importance	  of	  how	  space	  is	  constructed	  in	  social	  science	  research,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  recognizing	  
the	  variation	  in	  how	  space	  is	  used	  across	  different	  country	  contexts.	  We	  can	  think	  more	  about	  how	  to	  
theorize	  context	  so	  that	  specialization	  can	  be	  accounted	  for.	  Yet,	  as	  with	  much	  of	  the	  phronetic	  
approach,	  we	  resist	  modeling.	  We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  specify	  a	  model	  of	  how	  to	  do	  phronetic	  research	  for	  
that	  would	  undercut	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  should	  be	  something	  that	  varies	  with	  the	  context,	  otherwise	  it	  
would	  not	  be	  context	  sensitive.	  That	  said,	  context	  specific	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
how	  space	  is	  being	  constructed	  and	  how	  the	  people	  being	  studied	  understand	  social	  relations	  spatially.	  
We	  thus	  agree	  that	  space	  deserves	  its	  place	  in	  phronetic	  research.	  
As	  we	  write	  for	  this	  symposium,	  the	  US	  Senate	  has	  passed	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  Continuing	  
Appropriations	  Act	  of	  2013,	  which	  if	  sustained	  will	  limit	  National	  Science	  Funding	  to	  political	  science	  
only	  to	  those	  projects	  that	  are	  focused	  on	  national	  security	  and	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  
States.	  The	  conscious	  abolition	  of	  funding	  to	  such	  fundamental	  topics	  of	  political	  research,	  such	  as	  
voting,	  elections	  and	  democracy	  (among	  many	  others	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  the	  filibuster)	  shows	  that	  there	  
is	  now	  an	  even	  greater	  need	  to	  take	  on	  board	  a	  political	  science	  (and	  a	  social	  science	  more	  generally)	  
that	  engages	  with	  its	  subject	  matter	  and	  challenges	  entrenched	  interests	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  we	  believe	  the	  
essays	  in	  Real	  Social	  Science	  do.	  The	  further	  demonstration	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  phronetic	  approach	  
found	  in	  this	  new	  volume	  shows	  how,	  why	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  social	  science	  research	  can	  
matter,	  while	  our	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  institutional	  transformation	  made	  possible	  through	  
phronetic	  social	  science	  continues	  to	  be	  embraced	  by	  an	  increasingly	  larger	  number	  of	  individual	  social	  
scientists.	  
